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Abstract
We study experimentally the role of the network structure of pre-play communication in
determination of outcome and behavior in a multiplayer coordination game with conflicting
preferences. We explore the trade-off between the efficiency and equity of coordination outcomes
and its link to the network structure of communication. Our results show substantial variations in
both efficiency and equity of coordination outcomes across networks. While, as expected, increasing
the length of communication improves the chance of successful coordination, it also reduces the
asymmetry in the distribution of coordinated outcomes. We identify behaviors that explain variations
in the distribution of coordinated outcomes both within and across networks. In all treatments,
coordination is mostly explained by convergence in communication. (JEL: C70, C92, D61, D63,
D82, D83)
1. Introduction
In numerous social and economic situations, communication offers an effective means
to realize the myriad of benefits from coordination, without sacrificing the obvious
advantages of decentralized decision making. Coordination failures can mean forgone
economies of scale and scope in organizations, as well as being responsible for many
macroeconomic events with far-reaching consequences, such as bank runs, market
crashes, and contagions (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Morris and Shin 1998;
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Allen and Gale 2000; Angeletos and La’O 2013), which even prompt global efforts to
communicate towards common goals and actions.
Organizations have long recognized the connection between the structure
of communication and coordination outcomes. Consider, for instance, the well-
documented coordination failures of the multidivisional structure of General Motors
in the 1920s and Alfred Sloan’s remedy, which included creating a central office to
plan and coordinate overall strategy (e.g., Chandler 1962; Sloan 1990). The subsequent
popularity of this type of multidivisional organizational firm demonstrates the roles
that communication and coordination have in the success of a firm. However, as found
by Sloan himself, and later explored extensively in the organization literature (e.g.,
Milgrom and Roberts 1992), the overall performance of such an organization critically
hinged on fine balancing with regards to the issue of how much authority should be
centralized to the corporate headquarters. When the headquarters retained too much
power and authority, the operating divisions failed to act in ways that best met their
needs, thereby undermining the organization as a whole.
An important source of power is information, and the literature on network
analysis (e.g., Wasserman and Faust 1994; Goyal 2007; Jackson 2008) emphasizes
that the structure of interaction can matter, especially if it assigns asymmetric
advantages among individuals, because this can generate unequal outcomes and
payoffs. In the context of an organization, a hierarchical communication structure,
which confers a disproportionate informational advantage on the headquarters, might
end up coordinating on actions that are most preferred by the headquarters themselves
but not by the operating divisions. Despite the coordination, this might lead to a conflict
among the divisions and to other wasteful activities.
Putting together the lessons from organizations and the theories of networks, we
arrive at the following potential trade-off—a communication structure that improves
the chance of coordination might perform poorly in terms of distribution; not only might
this be undesirable in itself but it could generate adverse incentives and deadweight
losses elsewhere. Indeed, a growing number of empirical studies report evidence of
inequity aversion in work places, where relative material payoffs affect individuals’
behavior and welfare (e.g., Blinder and Choi 1990; Agell and Lundborg 1995; Bewley
1999; Clark and Oswald 1996; Campbell and Kamlani 1997). If the structure of
communication affects coordination, and if the distribution of surplus matters for
individual incentives, the tension between efficiency and equity of final outcomes
should pose an important consideration for the designer of communication protocol.
In this paper, we explore experimentally the strategic link between the structure of
pre-play communication and the outcome of coordination in a decentralized setting.
We aim to improve our understanding of how different communication structures affect
the outcome of coordination in terms of both efficiency and equity. In order to address
these questions, we consider a four-player version of the Battle of the Sexes game,
which contains both an element of coordination and an element of conflict. Each player
receives a positive payoff if and only if all players coordinate on the same action but
there is a different preferred alternative for each player. The symmetric nature of our
underlying game is chosen to highlight, if any, the role of the network structure of
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pre-play communication. We are interested in whether and how asymmetry in the
communication structure translates to the final outcome.
Prior to playing the above underlying game, the four players engage in multiple
periods of structured pre-play communication in which they announce nonbinding,
hence cheap talk, messages about their intended actions in the underlying game.
Although communication has no direct payoff consequences, the symmetry of players
in the underlying game can be broken and coordination can be achieved by implicit
agreements, and punishments for deviations, that can arise in the communication stage.
The more abundant the opportunities to talk, the more likely the chance of agreement,
and hence coordination (e.g., Farrell 1987; Rabin 1994).
In addition to the length of cheap talk, a key variable in our setup concerns the
extent to which each player observes the past history of players’ announcements,
which we interpret as the network structure of pre-play communication. Specifically,
at the beginning of each period of communication and the underlying game, a player
observes past messages of another player if and only if there is an undirected edge
between the two players. Four networks or undirected graphs are considered in
our four-player setup: the complete, star, kite, and line networks. In terms of an
organization, the complete network can be compared to a horizontal or flat structure
under which all the decision makers communicate with each other (e.g., via a committee
meeting), while the star network parallels an organization with a central office or
leader who is given the sole responsibility to collect information and to determine the
overall communication strategy. The other networks can be interpreted as representing
communication structures lying in between, with less concentration of informational
advantage on a single individual.
In the three networks other than the complete network, players have asymmetric
locational characteristics. In particular, some players are linked to only one other
player. This type of player is referred to as a periphery, and a player who is linked
to a periphery is referred to as a hub. The latter type of players occupy strategically
influential locations, in that some players rely entirely on their announcements to learn
about others’ intentions; thus, they are important objects of our analysis.
Our research questions can be summarized as follows.
QUESTION 1 (Efficiency). How is the likelihood of coordination affected by the
length and network structure of pre-play communication?
QUESTION 2 (Equity). How is the distribution of coordinated outcomes affected
by the length and network structure of pre-play communication?
The games that we study allow a very rich set of histories and strategies, thereby
admitting a large number of equilibria. Thus, standard theory does not offer strong
predictions as to whether the coordination outcome will be in any way dependent on
the structure of communication. We adopt an experimental approach to address our
questions. In the experimental design, we consider treatments that combine the four
networks and two different lengths of communication, as well as the underlying game
without communication.
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Our experimental results first establish a significant network effect on both the
efficiency and equity of the coordination outcome. Significant differences in the
coordination rate and the distribution of coordinated actions are observed across
networks for each given length of communication. Asymmetric networks tend to
generate asymmetric coordination outcomes in favor of hubs. However, our results
also demonstrate an important effect of extra communication. While, as expected,
an increase in the length of communication improves the chance of successful
coordination, it reduces the asymmetry in the distribution of coordinated outcomes.
Our experimental evidence thus points to the combined effect of the length and network
structure of communication as a determinant of coordination outcome.
We also search for regularities in the subjects’ behavior that offer explanations
of the variations in the observed frequency and distribution of coordination. Here, in
order to handle a vast amount of data on history-dependent actions against the problem
of multiple equilibria, we focus on finding evidence of a particular profile of behaviors
that naturally capture the strategic advantage of hub players: the hub insists on a single
message/action throughout the entire game, referred to as nonswitching behavior, and
the other players conform to the hub by playing the hub’s choice of action, even after
announcing different intentions of their own.
It turns out that this approach explains many differences in observed outcomes
across treatments. In particular, our experimental data reveal that the drop in the
frequency of coordination on the hub’s favorite outcome as we increase the length of
communication is induced by more frequent occurrences of switching behavior by the
hub. We also identify network-specific behavioral patterns that explain cross-network
variations in coordination outcomes.
Finally, in all treatments, the subjects’ announcements tend to converge; however,
less than unanimity is usually sufficient to ensure corresponding coordination. The
observed coordination rates are mostly explained by the frequency of convergence to
super-majority or unanimity in the communication stage. Therefore, our data suggest
that in real environments, players give more meaning to the messages than standard
theory of cheap talk, which always admits inessential multiplicity of equilibria, with
many different ways to combine messages to support a given outcome (e.g., Crawford
and Sobel 1982). The convergence is more akin to the equilibrium descriptions of
Farrell (1987) and Rabin (1994), in which players announce their intended actions
and negotiate over different Nash equilibria of the underlying game through the
communication stage.
Our paper contributes, above all, to the experimental literature on pre-play
communication via cheap talk; see Crawford (1998), Camerer (2003), and Ochs (2008)
for related surveys. Within this body of literature, Cooper et al. (1989) consider a two-
player Battle of the Sexes game with one period of cheap talk, but under two different
communication structures: one-way communication versus two-way communication.
In the former treatment, only one player can send a message to the other player, whereas
the two players send messages simultaneously to each other in the latter treatment.
They find that coordination rates are much higher in the one-way treatment than in
the two-way treatment, and also that the sender in the one-way treatment sends his
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favorite message, thereby inducing coordination on his favorite outcome, with a very
large frequency.
Cooper et al. (1992) and Burton, Loomes, and Sefton (2005) also compare the
two different communication structures in other two-player coordination games, in
particular, with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Their concern is to see whether cheap talk
helps the players to coordinate on the efficient outcome. Blume and Ortmann (2007)
test multiplayer coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, but their setup only
considers a single communication structure in which players learn the distribution of
messages prior to choosing actions. Duffy and Feltovich (2002) explore the role of
cheap talk in promoting cooperation and coordination in different games, and compare
it to that of dynamic incentives, while Corbae and Duffy (2008) examine the incentives
on network formation prior to playing coordination games.
While these papers all consider the effect of pre-play communication on
coordination, their settings are limited either in terms of the scope of the network
structure or in terms of the communication length; furthermore, the focus of their
analyses is only the issue of efficiency. In contrast, our paper explores how the
interaction between the horizon and network structure of communication affects
coordination; also, we analyze coordination outcome in terms of its distribution as
well as its likelihood.
Outside of the economics literature, Kearns et al. (2009) study the role of network
structure of communication in a coordination game with conflicting preferences
played by a large number of individuals. Although the underlying game and the net-
work/information protocols they study are different from ours, their findings also sug-
gest that some network structures better promote coordination and that certain locations
within a network end up obtaining greater earnings than others. A crucial difference
between their paper and ours, however, is that they do not investigate the interaction
between the time and network effects of communication, as we do in this paper.
Pre-play communication in social networks has been studied in the theoretical
models of Chwe (2000), Calvo´-Armengol and de Martı´ (2007, 2009), and Galeotti,
Ghiglino, and Squintani (2013), among others. In their setups, prior to playing
the underlying game, players simultaneously send messages about their private
information to others whom they are linked with (possibly in a directed way). Chwe
(2000) and Calvo´-Armengol and de Martı´ (2007, 2009) consider coordination games
with common interest and show that coordination can be achieved in networks with
fewer links than the complete network. In a setup that allows for conflicting preferences,
Galeotti et al. (2013) examine how players’ incentives to report the truth and their
welfare are related to the network structure.1 Thus, the central issue in these papers
is the role of network structure on efficiency. In contrast, our paper deals with the
distributional issue as well as efficiency. Moreover, unlike theirs, our setup allows
for multiple periods of communication, thereby shedding light on the effects of the
dynamics of communication.
1. Hagenback and Koessler (2009) consider the issue of endogenous network formation in a coordination
setup with pre-play communication.
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Finally, there is a large body of literature on organization design that attempts to
theorize the optimal structure of communication when coordination matters. This body
of literature, among other things, considers a number of different trade-offs between
coordination and noncoordination (e.g., Hart and Moore 2005; Alonso, Dessein, and
Matouschek 2008; Hart and Holmstro¨m 2010). Although we do not address the issue
of optimal design directly, our analysis compares different communication structures
along another trade-off, namely, the one between efficiency and equity. Our results
suggest that such a trade-off does exist across different networks but this effect becomes
diluted as more communication opportunities are introduced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
setup and, in Section 3, we present the experimental design and procedures. In
Section 4, we collect and discuss the experimental results. We conclude in Section
5. Online Appendices are also provided to present some details of the equilibrium
constructions mentioned Section 2 and some omitted experimental results, as well as
sample instructions used in the experiment.2
2. The Setup
We study games in which multiple players share a common interest to coordinate
but each player has his own preferred outcome. The following describes the
underlying game. There are four players, indexed by I = N , E, S, W , and each
player simultaneously and independently chooses an action, aI , from a common set
{n, e, s, w}. Let a = (aN , aE , aS, aW ) denote an action profile. Each player obtains a
positive payoff if and only if all players choose a single common action. Each player
has his preferred action corresponding to his label: player I obtains a higher payoff if
all players choose action i . Player I ’s payoff, uI (a), is given by
uI (a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if aI = aJ for some J = I ,
k1 if aI = aJ = i for all J = I ,
k2 if aI = aJ = i for all J = I ,
where k2 > k1 > 0. If there are only two players, the game corresponds to the well-
known Battle of the Sexes. In this sense, the underlying game can be interpreted as a
four-player version of Battle of the Sexes.
Prior to playing the underlying game, the players engage in finite periods of
pre-play communication, sometimes referred to as the communication stage. Pre-play
communication is cheap talk in the usual sense that it is nonbinding and payoff-
irrelevant. Let T denote the number of periods in the communication stage. In each
period t = 1, 2, . . . , T , each player I simultaneously and independently chooses a
message, denoted by mtI , from the set {n, e, s, w}. A message can therefore be
interpreted as the player’s intended action. We sometimes refer to T + 1 as the period
in which the players engage in the underlying game.
2. Online Appendices are available from authors’ websites as well as at the publisher’s website.
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FIGURE 1. Communication networks.
To complete the description of pre-play communication, we specify information
available to each player at the beginning of each communication period. In our game, a
player may or may not observe the past messages announced by other individuals. We
represent the information structure of the game by an undirected graph, or network.
If, at the beginning of each period t ≤ T + 1, players I and J observe the history of
messages chosen by each other up to, and including, period t − 1, then we say that
the two players can communicate with each other, and illustrate this by an undirected
edge or link between the two players. The network structure is common knowledge.
We consider four networks (i.e., complete, star, kite, and line), which are illustrated in
Figure 1.
In the complete network, each player can communicate with every other player.
In the star network, one central player (player E) can communicate with every other
player, while each of the other three players can communicate only with the central
player. In the kite network, three players (players N , E , and S) can communicate with
each other, while the remaining player (player W ) can communicate only with one
of the first three players (player E). In the line network, two players (players E and
W ) can communicate with two other players and each of the two remaining players
can communicate only with one of the first two players. The last three networks are
sometimes referred to as incomplete networks.3
3. Our choice of network structures is not exhaustive of all possible four-player networks. In particular,
we do not consider the circle network, which can be obtained by linking nodes N and S in the line
network. Because our main interest is on the effect of network asymmetry on the coordination outcome,
we have chosen the complete and line networks to serve as symmetric benchmarks for comparison. For
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The main objective of our analysis is to gain an understanding of how network
structure affects outcome and behavior. For this purpose, it will be helpful to identify
some key positions in the incomplete networks. A periphery is a player who has only
one link: N , S, and W in the star network, W in the kite network, and N and S in the
line network. A hub is a player who is linked to at least one periphery: E in the star
network, E in the kite network, and E and W in the line network. We sometimes refer
to the entire game that includes both the T -period communication stage with a given
network and the subsequent underlying game simply as the game with the particular
network.
In contrast to Farrell (1987) who analyzes the two-player Battle of the Sexes game
with multiple periods of pre-play cheap talk, our games are played by four players,
and this generates a very rich set of histories and strategies, thus admitting a large
number of equilibria (beyond the usual multiplicity of babbling equilibria). Even in
the game with the complete network, a variety of equilibrium communication patterns
are possible. For instance, symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria can be constructed such
that not only unanimous announcement of a common message but also a super-majority
outcome (i.e., all but one player choose the same message) or a majority outcome
(i.e., only two players choose the same message) constitutes an implicit agreement
to play the corresponding Nash equilibrium in the underlying game. Another source
of multiplicity of symmetric equilibria in our four-player games is the possibility of
partial agreements; that is, the players may treat certain communication outcomes as
an interim basis for further negotiation.4
3. Experimental Procedure
The experiment was run at the Experimental Laboratory of the Centre for Economic
Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) at University College London (UCL) between
May 2008 and November 2008, and between May 2011 and June 2011. The subjects
in the experiment were recruited from the ELSE pool of human subjects, mainly
including UCL undergraduate students across all disciplines. Each subject participated
in only one of the experimental sessions. After subjects had read the instructions,
the instructions were read aloud by an experimental administrator. Throughout
the experiment, we ensured anonymity and effective isolation of subjects in order
to minimize any interpersonal influences that could stimulate cooperation. Each
experimental session lasted between one hour and one and a half hours. The experiment
was computerized and conducted using the experimental software z-Tree developed
by Fischbacher (2007). Sample instructions are reported in Online Appendix II.
some measures of network asymmetry, such as network centrality, see Wasserman and Faust (1994), for
instance.
4. In Online Appendix I, we provide detailed examples of multiple equilibria along these lines under
the complete network. The equilibrium features that we address here are also present in games with
other networks, although in those cases equilibrium characterization is further complicated by imperfect
information.
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TABLE 1. Summary of experimental treatments.
Session
Network T 1 2 3 Total
Complete 2 16/80 16/80 16/80 48/240
5 20/100 16/80 16/80 52/260
Star 2 16/80 16/80 16/80 48/240
5 16/80 16/80 16/80 48/240
Kite 2 16/80 16/80 16/80 48/240
5 20/100 16/80 16/80 52/240
Line 2 16/80 16/80 16/80 48/240
5 16/80 16/80 16/80 48/240
No communication 20/150 16/120 12/90 48/360
We studied the game with four network structures (complete, star, kite and line)
and two lengths of pre-play communication—T = 2 (short) and T = 5 (long)—in
addition to the one-shot game with no communication (T = 0), which is included to
check whether communication indeed has a role.5 A single treatment consisting of
a pair of networks and T was used for each session, and each treatment was used
for three sessions. Thus, there were in total nine treatments and 27 experimental
sessions. Either 16 or 20 subjects participated in each session, which consisted of
20 independent rounds, except for the no-communication treatment whose sessions
consisted of 30 rounds each. In one session of the no-communication treatment,
12 subjects participated. Thus, we have in total 440 subjects who participated in
the experiment. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design and the amount of
experimental data. The first number in each cell is the number of subjects and the
second is the number of group observations in each treatment.
In each session, the network positions were labeled N , E , S, or W . One-
fourth of the subjects were randomly designated as type-N participants, one-fourth
as type-E participants, one-fourth as type-S participants, and one-fourth as type-
W participants. Each subject’s type remained constant throughout the session.6 In
each round, the subjects were randomly formed into four-person groups. The groups
formed in each round were independent of the groups formed in any of the other
rounds.
Each round was divided into two stages: a communication stage, which consists of
T (either 2 or 5) decision-turns, and an action stage, which consists of a single decision-
turn. In the no-communication treatment, there was only an action stage in each round.
5. The choice of communication lengths (T = 2 and T = 5) in our experimental design is partially
motivated by the theoretical considerations appearing in Online Appendix I. There, we construct sequential
equilibria of the three incomplete networks in which the hub obtains greater payoffs than the other players.
These equilibrium constructions require that T ≥ 3.
6. This design choice is irrelevant when all positions are symmetric (i.e., in the complete network and
no-communication treatments). For the other treatments, we want to avoid any possibility that alternating
roles within a session makes subjects confused and deters them from applying a consistent decision rule
across rounds.
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In the action stage, four actions were available: n, e, s, and w. The communication
stage that preceded the action stage involved each participant sending messages. In
each decision-turn of the communication stage, each participant was asked to choose
a message from n, e, s, and w, which were labeled by the same letters as the actions
available in the action stage. It was illustrated that a message may indicate a subject’s
intended action in the subsequent action stage but the subject does not have to follow
that message when it comes to making an action choice. When every participant in
the group had made his or her decision, each participant received the messages chosen
by the participants to whom he or she was connected in the network. This completed
the first decision-turn of the communication stage. This process was repeated in the
remaining decision-turns of the communication stage.
When the communication stage ended, each participant was asked to choose
an action out of the four possible actions without knowing the actions selected by
other participants. After every participant had made a decision in the action stage,
the computer informed subjects of the actions chosen by all the participants in the
group and their earnings. It was illustrated and emphasized that the earnings in each
round are determined only by the actions chosen in the action stage and the messages
chosen in the preceding communication stage are entirely irrelevant to earnings. After
each subject observed the results of the first round, the second round started with the
computer randomly forming new groups of four participants with distinct types. This
process was repeated until all 20 rounds were completed.
Earnings were calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged into British
pounds, where each token was worth £0.50. The earnings in each round were
determined as follows. If all participants in the group chose a common action, a
participant whose label corresponded to the letter of the common action received three
tokens while the other participants received one token each. Otherwise, all participants
received no token. Thus, the total payment to a subject was equal to £0.50 times the
total number of tokens earned over 20 rounds (30 rounds in the no-communication
treatment), plus a £5 participation fee. The average payment was about £13. Subjects
received their payments privately at the end of the session.
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Coordination Outcomes
We begin our analysis of the experimental data by examining the final outcomes
of coordination in each treatment. As summarized in the Introduction, the focus of
our interest lies in the impact of our treatments on both efficiency and equity of the
outcomes of the underlying game. To address the issue of efficiency, we consider the
rate of coordination; for equity, we examine the distribution of coordinated actions.
Table 2 reports the coordination rate for each session as well as for the pooled data
under each treatment. We also report the results of the statistical test of equality of
coordination rates across each pair of treatments, both for the pooled data (Table 3(a))
and for the session-level data (Table 3(b)).
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TABLE 2. Frequencies of coordination.
Complete Star Kite Line
Session T = 2 T = 5 T = 2 T = 5 T = 2 T = 5 T = 2 T = 5
No
communication
1 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.73 0.56 0.68 0.28 0.50 0.05
(80) (100) (80) (80) (80) (100) (80) (80) (150)
2 0.75 0.81 0.54 0.56 0.34 0.68 0.31 0.60 0.06
(80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (120)
3 0.83 0.80 0.50 0.70 0.65 0.61 0.41 0.59 0.14
(80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (90)
All 0.74 0.77 0.56 0.66 0.52 0.66 0.33 0.56 0.08
(240) (260) (240) (240) (240) (260) (240) (240) (360)
TABLE 3. Test of pairwise equality of coordination rates.
Complete Star Kite Line
2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5
No
communication
(a) Wilcoxon (Mann–Whitney) rank-sum test with the pooled data
Complete 2 – 0.539a 0.000b 0.058 0.000b 0.041 0.000b 0.000 0.000
5 – – 0.000 0.011b 0.000 0.007b 0.000 0.000b 0.000
Star 2 – – – 0.019a 0.361b 0.023 0.000b 0.927 0.000
5 – – – – 0.001 0.910b 0.000 0.025b 0.000
Kite 2 – – – – – 0.001a 0.000b 0.314 0.000
5 – – – – – – 0.000 0.029b 0.000
Line 2 – – – – – – – 0.000a 0.000
5 – – – – – – – – 0.000
No communication – – – – – – – – –
(b) Pairwise t-test with the session average data
Complete 2 – 0.662a 0.048b 0.331 0.101b 0.195 0.003b 0.040 0.000
5 – – 0.017 0.155b 0.063 0.051b 0.001 0.012b 0.000
Star 2 – – – 0.185a 0.703b 0.104 0.018b 0.940 0.001
5 – – – – 0.241 0.909b 0.007 0.168b 0.001
Kite 2 – – – – – 0.219a 0.146b 0.665 0.012
5 – – – – – – 0.002 0.071b 0.000
Line 2 – – – – – – – 0.011a 0.008
5 – – – – – – – – 0.000
No communication – – – – – – – – –
Notes: Each cell reports the p-value from the Wilcoxon (Mann–Whitney) rank-sum test in Table 3(a) and the
pairwise t-test in Table 3(b) on coordination rates between two treatments. The test results in Table 3(a) are
made by pooling the data, and those in Table 3(b) are done by treating the coordination rate in a session as an
independent observation. aA pairwise test between T = 2 and T = 5 within a network. bA pairwise test between
two networks given T .
The pooled-data analysis yields the following results. First, the coordination rate
in every treatment with communication is substantially higher than that in the no-
communication treatment (see in the last column in Table 3(a) for the statistical
results on pairwise comparison).7 Second, given each T , the highest coordination rate
is obtained in the complete network, followed by similar rates in the star and kite
networks, and then the distinctly lowest rate in the line network (see the values labeled
with a superscript b in Table 3(a)). Third, given each network, when communication
becomes longer, the coordination rate increases significantly in all networks except
for the complete network (see the values labeled with a superscript a in Table 3(a)).
7. Our experiment employs a random matching design with fixed roles. Thus, for the statistical validity
of pairwise comparison in the pooled data, we assume independence of each game observation within each
session. However, correlation across games would underestimate standard errors.
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FIGURE 2. Frequencies of coordination (sample means and 95% confidence intervals).
Let us illustrate these findings in Figure 2, where we plot the coordination rates across
treatments with a 95% confidence interval.
Next, we turn to session-level analysis by treating each session average as a single,
independent observation. The session-level data reveal patterns that are qualitatively
similar to the variations in the coordination rate for the pooled data, although fewer
differences in coordination rates are statistically significant because of the small
samples. First, the effect of communication in every treatment relative to the no-
communication treatment is statistically significant even in the session level (see the
last column in Table 3(b)). Second, fixing T , we cannot reject at a 5% significance
level, the equality of coordination rates between the complete and kite networks when
T = 2 and between the complete, star, and kite networks when T = 5 (see the values
labeled with a superscript b in Table 3(b)). Third, fixing the network, the positive
effect of extra communication is no longer significant in all networks except for the
line network (see the values labeled with a superscript a in Table 3(b)).
Overall, we summarize these findings as follows.
RESULT 1 (Efficiency).
1. Coordination rates are higher in treatments with communication than in the
treatment with no communication.
2. Given any time treatment T , coordination rates are highest in the complete
network, followed by the star and kite networks, and then by the line network.
3. Given any network treatment other than the complete network, the coordination
rate increases from T = 2 to T = 5.
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TABLE 4. Frequencies of coordinated actions.
Action
Network T Session n e s w No. obs. p-value
Complete 2 1 0.19 0.33 0.23 0.25 52 0.57
2 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.22 60 0.91
3 0.21 0.29 0.21 0.29 66 0.68
All 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.25 178 0.68
5 1 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.24 70 0.98
2 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.29 65 0.76
3 0.23 0.30 0.25 0.22 64 0.83
All 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 199 1.00
Star 2 1 0.10 0.76 0.06 0.08 51 0.00
2 0.09 0.72 0.09 0.09 43 0.00
3 0.20 0.45 0.13 0.23 40 0.02
All 0.13 0.66 0.09 0.13 134 0.00
5 1 0.19 0.45 0.19 0.17 58 0.01
2 0.16 0.53 0.16 0.16 45 0.00
3 0.11 0.63 0.09 0.18 56 0.00
All 0.15 0.53 0.14 0.17 159 0.00
Kite 2 1 0.18 0.56 0.16 0.11 45 0.00
2 0.07 0.78 0.11 0.04 27 0.00
3 0.23 0.54 0.12 0.12 52 0.00
All 0.18 0.60 0.13 0.10 124 0.00
5 1 0.16 0.34 0.21 0.29 68 0.15
2 0.24 0.35 0.19 0.22 54 0.34
3 0.16 0.31 0.27 0.27 49 0.54
All 0.19 0.33 0.22 0.26 171 0.04
Line 2 1 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.27 22 0.91
2 0.04 0.72 0.04 0.20 25 0.00
3 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.82 33 0.00
All 0.09 0.36 0.08 0.48 80 0.00
5 1 0.23 0.30 0.18 0.30 40 0.61
2 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.31 48 0.76
3 0.19 0.40 0.13 0.28 47 0.04
All 0.21 0.32 0.18 0.30 135 0.06
No communication 1 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 8 0.00
2 0.29 0.00 0.71 0.00 7 0.00
3 0.85 0.08 0.08 0.00 13 0.00
All 0.68 0.11 0.21 0.00 28 0.00
Note: A p-value is from the chi-square nonparametric test with null hypothesis that the action frequencies are
uniformly distributed.
Next, in Table 4, we present the distribution of coordinated outcomes in the
underlying game per session as well as for the pooled data, along with the p-values
from the chi-square nonparametric test for uniform distribution.
Figure 3 illustrates graphically, conditional on coordination, whose preferred
outcome was coordinated on for the pooled data.
We observe a notable effect of both the length and network structure of
communication on the distribution of coordinated outcomes. First, while the
distribution of coordinated outcomes in the complete network is close to uniform,
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FIGURE 3. Frequencies of coordinated actions.
both when T = 2 and when T = 5, in all three incomplete networks, the distributions
appear significantly asymmetric in favor of the hub (E in star and kite; E and W in line).
Thus, the data confirm the intuition that network asymmetry matters; in particular, the
symmetry of the underlying game is broken in favor of the hub.
Second, both when T = 2 and when T = 5, the likelihood of coordination on
action e is higher in the star network than in the kite network. This appears to suggest
that an additional link between N and S in the kite network reduces the hub player E’s
strategic advantage. We investigate this issue further in Section 4.3.
Third, and most interestingly, there is strong evidence of the time effect in all
three incomplete networks. Here, the longer the players engage in cheap talk, the
less frequently they coordinate on the favorite action of a hub. Furthermore, in the
star and line networks, the likelihood of coordination on each of the peripheries
appears to increase by equal proportion as we go from T = 2 to T = 5; in the kite
network, however, the decrease in the likelihood of coordination on the hub E’s
favorite action is matched disproportionately by an increase in the likelihood of the
periphery W ’s favorite action. This observation is consistent with the symmetry-
breaking role of network structure. The frequent occurrence of action w in the kite
network when T = 5 can be justified by the fact that W is the only player with a single
link.
For both time treatments, and for each session and the pooled data, we cannot
statistically reject the uniform distribution in the complete network while rejecting the
null in the star network. In the kite network, the distribution is statistically different
from uniform when T = 2 but we cannot reject the null for each session when T = 5
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(although we reject it for the pooled data). Similarly, in the line network, the null of
uniform distribution is mostly rejected when T = 2 but mostly not when T = 5.
In summary, the data support the following.
RESULT 2 (Equity).
1. We observe the following both when T = 2 and when T = 5.
(a) In the complete network, the distribution of coordinated actions is close to
uniform.
(b) In the star and kite networks, the distribution of coordinated actions is
concentrated on action e; in the line network, the distribution is concentrated
on actions e and w.
2. Given any T , the frequency of coordination on action e is higher in the star network
than in the kite network.
3. Given any incomplete network, the distribution of coordinated actions is less
asymmetric when T = 5 than when T = 2.
Despite the multiplicity of equilibria, our experimental results strongly support
regularity of certain patterns in outcomes. The network structure of communication
does matter for both efficiency and equity of coordination outcomes. However, the
length of communication also plays an important role. Our results suggest that allowing
the players to communicate longer will not only improve efficiency but also make
the coordination outcome more equitable in the networks that produce asymmetric
coordination outcomes.8
4.2. Communication and Coordination
Next, we examine the play of the communication stage and relate the dynamics of
communication to coordination outcomes. First, we consider the form of agreement
that leads to coordination. Table 5 presents the likelihood of coordination (on any
action) in the underlying game contingent on each possible outcome in the last
period of the communication stage, together with the number of observations for
each communication outcome.9
In the complete network, communication outcomes are divided into five categories:
unanimity, super-majority, majority, tied-majority, and complete disagreement.
Unanimity is an outcome in which all four players announce the same message;
super-majority is an outcome in which all but one player choose the same message;
8. Our analysis in Tables 2–4 pools the data from all rounds in each session for a given treatment. We have
conducted a parallel analysis of Tables 2–4 by considering the first-half rounds and second-half rounds of
the data separately. Our results, which appear in Online Appendix III.1 (Tables 1A and 2A), suggest that
there is little evidence of behavioral adjustments over rounds in the data.
9. In what follows, all our results are based on pooled data.
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TABLE 5. Relation between last-period communication and coordination.
T = 2 T = 5
Outcome Coord. freq. No. obs. Coord. freq. No. obs.
(a) Complete
Unanimity 0.96 80 0.96 121
Super-majority 0.83 70 0.66 101
Majority 0.80 54 0.56 27
Tied-majority 0.00 13 0.00 6
Complete disagreement 0.00 23 0.20 5
Total 0.74 240 0.77 260
(b) Star
Unanimity 0.89 47 0.90 77
Super-majority NES/NEW/ESW 0.61 93 0.66 92
NSW 0.00 2 0.00 2
Majority NE/EW/ES 0.39 61 0.45 42
NS/NW/SW 0.50 8 0.29 7
Others 0.24 29 0.40 20
Total 0.56 240 0.66 240
(c) Kite
Unanimity 0.96 27 0.94 85
Super-majority NES/NEW/ESW 0.71 87 0.73 99
NSW – 0 0.00 4
Majority NE/EW/ES 0.40 63 0.39 36
NS/NW/SW 0.04 25 0.07 15
Others 0.26 38 0.19 21
Total 0.52 240 0.66 260
(d) Line
Unanimity 1.00 26 1.00 90
Super-majority NEW/ESW 0.53 74 0.64 61
NSW/NES 0.23 31 0.00 7
Majority EW 0.36 11 0.50 8
NW/ES/NE/SW 0.02 52 0.00 32
NS 0.00 6 0.50 2
Others 0.08 40 0.03 40
Total 0.33 240 0.56 240
majority is an outcome in which only two players announce the same message; tied-
majority is an outcome with two distinct pairs of two players who choose the same
message; and complete disagreement is an outcome in which each player announces
a distinct message. In the incomplete (star, kite, and line) networks, we divide super-
majority and majority further by identifying whether such an outcome includes the hub
player(s). For example, a super-majority outcome NES in the star network represents
players N , E , and S choosing the same message in period T .10
10. Because of the small number of observations, tied-majority and complete disagreement are treated
as one outcome in each of the incomplete networks.
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TABLE 6. Frequencies of unanimity and super-majority.
Time (t)
Network T 1 2 3 4 5
Coordination
frequency
Complete 2 0.17 0.63 – – – 0.74
(–) (0.46) – – –
5 0.08 0.32 0.50 0.67 0.85 0.77
(–) (0.23) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19)
Star 2 0.18 0.58 – – – 0.56
(–) (0.40) – – –
5 0.07 0.29 0.39 0.47 0.70 0.66
(–) (0.23) (0.10) (0.08) (0.24)
Kite 2 0.12 0.48 – – – 0.52
(–) (0.35) – – –
5 0.07 0.20 0.30 0.47 0.71 0.66
(–) (0.14) (0.09) (0.18) (0.24)
Line 2 0.10 0.42 – – – 0.33
(–) (0.32) – – –
5 0.04 0.18 0.29 0.45 0.63 0.56
(–) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18)
Notes: A number in parentheses is the marginal change from period t − 1 to period t . For incomplete networks,
we consider only super-majority including the hub(s).
There is a strong relation between what happens in the last period of the
communication stage and coordination in the underlying game across all treatments;
a wider consensus improves the chance of coordination. Unanimity leads to
coordination almost with certainty in all treatments. Super-majority is very likely
to induce coordination in most of the treatments, one possible exception being
the line network with T = 2. Notice here that almost all super-majority outcomes
in period T include the hub(s), except in the line network with T = 2. Although
majority also leads to coordination with a large probability in the complete network,
especially when T = 2, this correlation does not exceed a half in all other network
treatments.
Another observation from Table 5 is the high frequencies of unanimity and super-
majority in the last period of communication. For instance, in the complete network,
the subjects reached super-majority or unanimity by period T in 63% of observations
when T = 2 (150/240) and 85% of observations when T = 5 (222/260). This leads us
to Table 6, which reports the frequency of unanimity or super-majority occurring in
each period t ≤ T .
There is a clear pattern of convergence towards unanimity or super-majority in all
treatments. The chance of one of these two types of communication outcome in the
first period is low, ranging from 0.04 (line network with T = 5) and 0.18 (star network
with T = 2), but it increases monotonically over time in all treatments. Moreover, in
all treatments, the chance of eventual coordination (the last column) is very close to
the chance of successfully reaching such an outcome.
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We summarize these findings from Tables 5 and 6, as follows.
RESULT 3. We observe the following patterns in all treatments.
1. A greater degree of agreement in the last period of communication is associated
with a greater likelihood of coordination.
2. The outcome path in the communication stage converges towards super-majority
or unanimity.
3. The coordination rate is mostly explained by the frequency of convergence to
super-majority or unanimity in the communication stage.
These observations indicate the following. First, the link between the form of
agreement and coordination suggests that the experimental subjects give more meaning
to the messages than standard theory of cheap talk in which inessential equilibria can
be constructed with arbitrary sequences of messages to support any given equilibrium
outcome (e.g., Crawford and Sobel 1982). Second, the convergence towards tighter
consensus in the communication stage could be interpreted as the players announcing
intended actions and bargaining over different equilibria of the underlying game, akin
to the equilibrium characterizations of Farrell (1987) and Rabin (1994). However,
in our four-player setup, the nature of communication dynamics is not one of “all or
nothing”, in the sense that agreements are built gradually. Finally, the strong correlation
between the frequency of convergence and the eventual coordination rate implies that
the role of network structure in determining the efficiency of coordination outcome
does depend on how well it facilitates the formation of implicit agreement among the
players.
4.3. Behavior in the Incomplete Networks
Evidence in Section 4.1 shows that the distribution of coordinated actions in each of
the three incomplete (star, kite, and line) networks turns out to be highly asymmetric
in favor of the hub(s), but extra communication reduces such asymmetry. Also, given
T , the degree of inequity is greater in the star network than in the kite network. We
next explore the subjects’ behavior in the incomplete networks.11 In our games with
incomplete networks, there exist a number of equilibrium strategies that result in the
hub obtaining disproportionately large payoffs. In order to facilitate the data analysis
in the presence of multiple equilibria, we focus on identifying the most natural set
of behaviors through which the hub captures his informational advantage: the hub
insists on a single message/action throughout the entire game, while the other players
follow the action of the hub’s choice even after expressing different intentions of their
own.12 This approach of isolating a particular behavioral pattern not only helps to
11. See Online Appendix III.2 for an analysis of behavior in the complete network.
12. It is straightforward to construct sequential equilibria of this kind under each incomplete network.
For instance, in the star network, player E’s insistence on, say, message e is met with the belief by each
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TABLE 7. Behavior of the hub, and frequencies of nonswitching by the hub after initial disagreement.
Network T Nonswitching Switching Nonswitching after initial disagreement
Star 2 0.90 0.10 0.81
(0.74) (0.78) (94)
5 0.79 0.21 0.78
(0.68) (0.50) (117)
Kite 2 0.82 0.18 0.63
(0.80) (0.83) (106)
5 0.47 0.53 0.38
(0.71) (0.74) (157)
Line 2 0.71 0.29 0.57
(0.74) (0.82) (302)
5 0.48 0.52 0.37
(0.66) (0.60) (329)
organize a vast amount of data in our dynamic games where we need to consider
history-dependent behaviors but turns out to explain many differences in outcomes
across treatments.
Hub. Of particular interest is how often the hub insists on a single message/action
throughout the entire game, which we refer to as nonswitching behavior; any other
observed behavior is referred to as switching behavior. Table 7 presents the frequencies
of nonswitching and switching behaviors in the incomplete networks, together with
the frequency of the hub initially choosing his own favorite message conditional on
each category (in parentheses).
The last column of Table 7 shows how reluctant the hub is to switch from his initial
message when he finds himself in conflict with every other player in t = 1, together
with the number of observations (in parentheses).
This table reports a marked difference in the hub’s behavior across the three
incomplete networks. First, the hub in the star network exhibits a strong tendency to
insist his initial message throughout the game (even after complete disagreement) both
when T = 2 and when T = 5. None the less, such tendency is less pronounced when
T = 5 (0.79) compared to when T = 2 (0.90). Second, the frequencies of nonswitching
by each hub in the kite and line networks are lower compared to the star network; more
importantly, these frequencies fall significantly as we increase T (from 0.82 to 0.47 in
kite and from 0.71 to 0.48 in line).
Next, Table 8 presents the distribution of coordinated actions in the underlying
game, conditional on the hub’s behavior.
Note here that, in both time treatments for the star network, coordination occurs
mostly when the hub does not switch from his initial message: 0.96 (= 128/134)
when T = 2 and 0.84 (= 133/159) when T = 5. A similar pattern is established
periphery that the others have also chosen the same message and will play action e in the underlying game,
while observation of any other message by E triggers the (off-the-equilibrium) belief that someone has
deviated, leading to coordination failure.
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TABLE 8. Frequencies of coordinated actions conditional on nonswitching/switching.
Network T Switching N E S W Total
Star 2 No 15 87 12 14 128
Yes 2 1 0 3 6
5 No 20 76 19 18 133
Yes 4 9 4 9 26
Kite 2 No 12 74 9 5 100
Yes 10 0 7 7 24
5 No 5 47 8 11 71
Yes 27 10 29 34 100
Line 2 No 5 29 4 19 57
Yes 2 0 2 19 23
5 No 8 29 8 12 57
Yes 20 14 16 18 78
in the kite and line networks with T = 2: 0.81 (= 100/124) and 0.71 (= 57/80),
respectively. However, in the kite and line networks with T = 5, coordination is more
likely to occur when the hub switches from his initial message: 0.58 (= 100/171)
and 0.58 (=78/135), respectively. Also, when coordination results from switching in
these networks, the distribution of coordinated actions is not concentrated on the hubs’
favorite actions. In particular, in the kite network with T = 5, coordination is more
likely to occur on actions other than the hub’s favorite action e.
These findings are summarized as follows.
RESULT 4.
1. In the star network, the hub displays a strong tendency of nonswitching behavior
both when T = 2 and when T = 5, although the frequency of switching behavior
increases with T . Coordination occurs mostly under nonswitching.
2. In the kite and line networks, the hub displays a strong tendency of nonswitching
behavior when T = 2 but the frequency of switching behavior is greater than
that of nonswitching when T = 5. When coordination results from switching,
the distribution of coordinated actions is not concentrated on the hubs’ favorite
actions.
The increased equity of coordinated outcomes in the incomplete networks under
long communication therefore appears to result from the greater frequency of switching
behavior from the hub(s). However, this behavioral shift as we move from T = 2 to
T = 5 is substantially stronger in the kite and line networks than in the star network.13
13. Overall, individual-level behaviors across treatments appear consistent with the aggregate-level
results. Table 5A in Online Appendix III.3 summarizes the individual-level frequencies of nonswitching
behavior and choosing his own favorite message conditional on nonswitching behavior by the hub(s).
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TABLE 9. Behavior of the periphery: mtI = mt−1H .
Time (t)
Message in t − 1 Network T 2 3 4 5 6
Star 2 0.42 (528) 0.66 (318) – – –
5 0.25 (581) 0.14 (475) 0.16 (422) 0.38 (378) 0.67 (251)
mt−1I = mt−1H Kite 2 0.16 (173) 0.59 (149) – – –
5 0.13 (210) 0.11 (192) 0.14 (177) 0.41 (145) 0.68 (104)
Line 2 0.27 (370) 0.50 (238) – – –
5 0.22 (421) 0.23 (342) 0.33 (281) 0.50 (201) 0.66 (138)
Star 2 0.97 (192) 0.98 (402) – – –
5 0.97 (139) 0.96 (245) 0.99 (298) 0.99 (342) 0.99 (469)
mt−1I = mt−1H Kite 2 0.99 (67) 1.00 (91) – – –
5 0.84 (50) 0.93 (68) 0.98 (83) 0.96 (115) 0.96 (156)
Line 2 0.99 (110) 0.99 (242) – – –
5 0.95 (59) 0.96 (138) 1.00 (199) 1.00 (279) 1.00 (342)
Notes: A number in parentheses is the number of observations. I is a periphery: N/S/W in star, W in kite, and
N/S in line. H is the hub that I is linked to: E in star and kite, and E/W in line. The message or action of
periphery I (hub H ) in period t is denoted by mtI (mtH ). The action stage is referred to as t = T + 1, T = 2, 5.
Other Nodes. Given the different behavioral tendencies of the hub across treatments,
it is important to understand how players in other nodes behave. In particular, we want
to investigate why the hub’s advantage is lower in the kite network than in the star
network for each T . Because the only structural difference between the two networks
is the additional link between players N and S in the kite network, the behavior of
these players should hold key to answering this question. However, before addressing
the behavior of these two players, we first consider how peripheries behave in the
incomplete networks.
Table 9 presents the behavior of peripheries in the star, kite, and line networks.
Because information about past play of the game flows to a periphery only through the
hub that he is linked to, it is natural to examine a periphery’s willingness to conform
to the hub (i.e., choosing the hub’s previous message). For this purpose, we divide the
relevant histories of observations at the beginning of each period t ≤ T + 1 (including
the action stage) into whether or not a periphery’s message in the previous period
coincided with the message chosen by the hub.
The following patterns are observed in all treatments. Not surprisingly, at a history
in which the periphery and hub chose a common message in the previous period (the
bottom panel of Table 9), the periphery continues to choose the same message almost
surely. At other histories with disagreements, the periphery’s tendency to copy the
hub’s previous message increases significantly towards the end of the entire game.
Also, for a given network, this probability is higher at the end of the game when T = 5
than when T = 2.14
14. Table 6A in Online Appendix III.3 provides an individual-level analysis of peripheries’ conformity
at histories with disagreements.
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TABLE 10. Behavior of players N and S in the kite network.
(I = J = N or S) Time (t)
Message in (t − 1) Behavior in t T 2 3 4 5 6
mt−1I = mt−1J = mt−1E mtI = mt−1I 2 0.95 (60) 0.56 (50) – – –
5 0.93 (76) 0.94 (78) 0.97 (74) 0.89 (80) 0.77 (44)
mtI = mt−1E 2 0.05 (60) 0.44 (50) – – –
5 0.03 (76) 0.04 (78) 0.00 (74) 0.11 (80) 0.23 (44)
mt−1I = mt−1J = mt−1E mtI = mt−1I 2 0.67 (236) 0.40 (98) – – –
5 0.89 (300) 0.83 (276) 0.76 (202) 0.60 (118) 0.45 (44)
mtI = mt−1E 2 0.24 (236) 0.57 (98) – – –
5 0.04 (300) 0.09 (276) 0.10 (202) 0.30 (118) 0.50 (44)
mt−1I = mt−1J = mt−1E mtI = mt−1I 2 0.35 (79) 0.21 (85) – – –
5 0.62 (61) 0.77 (43) 0.62 (61) 0.55 (60) 0.20 (74)
mtI = mt−1E 2 0.62 (79) 0.79 (85) – – –
5 0.34 (61) 0.21 (43) 0.36 (61) 0.43 (60) 0.77 (74)
Notes: Player I’s message or action in t is denoted by mtI . A number in parentheses is the number of observations.
Let us now compare these observations with the behavior of N and S in the kite
network. We examine the histories at which either of the two players is in disagreement
with the hub, E . Because N and S can observe each other’s past messages, the relevant
histories at the beginning of t ≤ T + 1 are partitioned into the following three sets
about the three players’ messages in t − 1: (i) N and S played the same message
different from E’s message; (ii) all three players played distinct messages; (iii) either
N or S played the same message as E . Table 10 presents the behavior of players N
and S in the kite network at these histories.
The difference in behavior between these two players and a periphery is most
clearly seen by the decisions made by N and S contingent on the first type of histories.
Here, in both time treatments, the two players are much more likely to stick with their
own previous message than to conform with the hub. In this case, the probability that
either N or S switches to the hub’s message when playing the underlying game is just
0.44 when T = 2 and 0.23 when T = 5. Even when all three players played differently,
the probability of conformity is lower when T = 5 (equal to 0.50), compared to the
corresponding tendency exhibited by the periphery, W , in the same treatment (equal
to 0.68), as seen in Table 9. However, when one of N and S has agreed with E in the
previous period, the other player is likely to conform to E (0.79 when T = 2 and 0.77
when T = 5). Together with the high tendency of conformity by the peripheries in the
star and kite networks (Table 9), these observations (Table 10) lead to the following
result.
RESULT 5. Both when T = 2 and when T = 5, players N and S in the kite network
are less likely to conform to the hub than the peripheries in the incomplete networks.
We have already seen that, when T = 2, the hub in both star and kite networks
exhibits nonswitching behavior (Result 4) and also such behavior is frequently
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accompanied by the hub’s own favorite message/action (Table 7). Thus, Result 5
gives an explanation for why under this time treatment, the distribution of coordinated
outcomes is less asymmetric in the kite network than in the star network. Furthermore,
Result 5 suggests that the less conforming behavior of N and S is what induces the
hub in the kite network to switch his messages much more frequently when T = 5,
which in turn reduces the hub’s payoff advantage.
5. Conclusion
We have explored the role of network structure and length of pre-play communication
in a symmetric four-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Our main
conclusions are that, in contrast to the multiple equilibrium predictions of standard
theory, behavior and outcome depend more predictably on the network structure of pre-
play communication. Moreover, network structure has important implications for both
issues of efficiency and equity of coordination. In particular, we have identified how
certain network structures break the symmetry of players in the underlying game in such
a way that confers strategic edge, and hence higher payoffs, to some individuals. None
the less, the extent of such strategic advantage depends on the length of communication.
When communication lasts longer, this advantage becomes weaker, which in turn
makes coordination outcomes more equitable. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates
that such a positive time effect on equity is driven by greater information flows across
individuals facilitated by the hub’s switching behavior. In all treatments, coordination
is mostly explained by convergence in communication, thereby suggesting that the
players indeed announce their intended actions and negotiate over which outcome to
coordinate on through the communication stage.
Our experimental findings suggest an important open question: does network
structure matter when the players can engage in a very long cheap talk?15 Our
experiments do show that the differences in the coordination rate and the distribution
of coordinated actions become smaller across networks as the length of cheap talk is
increased. However, we also observe that this effect is induced by particular behaviors.
Although a fuller study to uncover the long-run implications of network structure lies
beyond the scope of this paper, our findings suggest that such a study may need to
address the precise channels of convergence in outcomes.
Although our study does not directly address the issue of optimal
network/organization design, it uncovers potential variations in the performance of
different networks when conflicting objectives are present. In our experiments, the
complete network achieves the highest rate of coordination as well as the most
symmetric distribution of outcomes. However, if we take into account the possible
cost of each link and/or message, the issue of optimal communication network in
15. See Aumann and Hart (2003) for an analysis of games with infinite cheap talk.
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our setup remains open.16 For instance, the star network involves less communication
and also appears to be effective in promoting common actions but at the expense of
equitable payoffs. What do these observations imply for the merits of organizations
and teams that have a leader endowed with superior access to information, relative
to other more horizontal information-sharing arrangements? In order to address these
questions, we would need a more detailed specification of how inequity aversion
translates to inefficiencies elsewhere. Our analysis offers a framework that can be
enriched to take on these interesting issues for future research.
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